top of page

Six Unpatched Flaws Let Attackers Take Over Danfoss AK-SM800A Refrigeration Controllers Without a Password, and Strict Mode Does Not Cover Them All. Take the Controller Off the Internet

Writer: Patrick Duggan
Patrick Duggan
18 minutes ago
6 min read

If you run a Danfoss AK-SM800A refrigeration controller and its management page can be reached from the internet, take it off the internet today. That includes a unit reached through a service company's 4G or 5G modem with a public address, a port forward on the store router, or a DMZ setting. Give remote access only through a VPN or a private mobile network. On Wednesday, November 11, the Dutch firm Midnight Blue published six flaws in this controller that, by its account, let someone with no password run code on it as root. There is no patch, no CVE number and no Danfoss advisory yet. Changing passwords and turning on Danfoss's Strict mode are worth doing, but they do not close all six.


The AK-SM800A is a system manager that runs refrigeration in supermarkets and other cold storage. Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC units were among the controllers named in the French supermarket attacks of October 11 and 12, which we covered on November 2. That post was about controllers exposed on the internet. It was written before these six flaws were published, and nothing we have read says these flaws were used in those attacks.





What is confirmed


Midnight Blue researcher Carlo Meijer reports six pre-authentication remote code execution flaws in the Danfoss AK-SM800A, all stack-based buffer overflows. The writeup lists the affected versions as "All up to and including 5.3.2", which it calls the latest firmware at the time of writing. It lists the CVEs as "Pending" and withholds the technical details because coordinated disclosure with Danfoss is still under way. Germany's BSI dates the publication to November 11.


What the researchers say they showed, and what they say could follow, are different things:


  • Five flaws are in web request handlers that need no login. Midnight Blue ran code as root on the controller through one of them, on firmware 3.3.0, and says the same bugs are in 5.3.2.

  • Strict mode stops those five, by the researchers' account. Strict mode is Danfoss's session-control setting, which requires HTTPS and a session token. Midnight Blue says that at the Strict level "virtually all the web-accessible attack surface is fenced off from unauthenticated users", including the bug it exploited. Midnight Blue says Strict became the default at version 4.0. Danfoss's November update guide says 4.3.1.

  • The sixth flaw is in the gate itself. It is in sm_fcgi_app, the program that decides whether a request is logged in. With Strict mode on, against the latest firmware, it crashed in the researchers' emulator. They write that "with some additional effort" it can be turned into another pre-authentication code execution. They did not show that.

  • No exploit hardening and no secure boot. The researchers say the binaries are built without stack canaries or position-independent code, and that the controller does not use the processor's secure boot. That is why they warn that an attacker with root could leave code that survives a factory reset or firmware update, or brick the controller so it has to be replaced. That is a risk they describe, not something they report seeing.

Three government agencies have issued warnings. The Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium published one on November 12, according to the BSI. Ireland's NCSC and Germany's BSI each published one on Friday, November 13. The Irish advisory says that "CVE identifiers have not been assigned, no patches are available, and coordinated disclosure with the vendor is ongoing", and that organizations "should not rely on firmware updates, password changes or Strict Mode alone to protect an internet-exposed controller." The BSI rates it 3 on its 4-step scale (orange, act without delay), lists no fixed version, and says firmware "bis mindestens 5.3.2", up to at least 5.3.2, is affected.


Danfoss's security advisories page, which we read today, has no entry for these flaws. Its most recent AK-SM800A entries are older, fixed CVEs: CVE-2025-41450, an authentication bypass fixed in 4.2, and CVE-2025-41451 and CVE-2025-41452, fixed in 4.3.1.



What is not known


  • Whether anyone has used these six flaws. The BSI says no active exploitation is known. No source we read connects them to the October and November attacks.

  • Whether firmware 5.4.0 fixes them. Danfoss's step-by-step update guide for the AK-SM800A, dated November 2026, documents a 5.4.0 software package and lists one security change for it, a stricter password policy. It does not mention these flaws. The Hacker News reports that the researchers think 5.4.0 was built on October 29, before they reported, and does not fix them, and that the BSI first said 5.4.0 was unaffected and then corrected itself. We could not find either statement in the documents we read: the Midnight Blue writeup does not mention 5.4.0, and the BSI notice we downloaded is version 1.0 and says "up to at least 5.3.2". Treat 5.4.0 as unproven, not as the fix.

  • Whether other Danfoss models are affected. Midnight Blue names only the AK-SM800A. Ireland's NCSC lists the AK-SC and AK-SM series and Copeland or Dixell XWEB in its table of affected products, which covers the attack campaign as a whole, not only these six flaws.

  • How many units are exposed. Midnight Blue cites a Censys search dated 10-11-2026 showing "hundreds of Danfoss systems exposed online", and adds that a sizeable share are probably honeypots. It gives no exact number. On November 2 we could not fingerprint Danfoss pages on Shodan at all, so we have no count of our own.


What to do


  1. Find every controller that can be reached from the internet. Check your own public addresses and every modem a refrigeration contractor installed. Danfoss's guide counts a unit as exposed if it has a public IP address (including one from a SIM card), a forwarded port, a DMZ setting or UPnP turned on.

  2. Take those off the internet. Use a VPN that the site starts, or a SIM plan with private or NAT addressing. Turn off port forwarding, DMZ and UPnP on the router or modem. Danfoss says the AK-SM800A "should not be directly reachable from the public internet", and that this "applies to all software versions, including those with Strict Mode enabled."

  3. Treat an allow-list as a stopgap. Letting in only your service company's addresses is better than nothing. Ireland's NCSC and, per Midnight Blue, France's CERT-FR both call it temporary, not a fix.

  4. Keep Strict mode on and change default passwords anyway. These steps still block the older, published flaws and five of the six new ones by the researchers' account. They do not block the sixth.

  5. Check for tampering. If a controller was reachable from the internet, compare its temperature set points, defrost schedules, alarm settings, user accounts and remote-access settings against what you expect, as the Irish NCSC advises. If you suspect a compromise, change every credential and check that the connected equipment works.

  6. Talk to your service company before you cut it off. The Irish and Belgian advisories, as The Hacker News reports them, warn to check contract and insurance terms and to set up protected access first, so alarm monitoring does not stop.

  7. Watch for the Danfoss advisory. When CVE numbers and a fixed version appear, the fix becomes an install. Until then, network exposure is the only control you have.


How we know


We read the Midnight Blue writeup, the Irish NCSC advisory PDF, the BSI security notice PDF, Danfoss's AK-SM800A update guide PDF and Danfoss's security advisories page, all on November 16. The Belgian CCB advisory returned HTTP 403 to us, so what we say about it comes from the BSI's and The Hacker News's descriptions of it. We found the story through The Hacker News. CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (release of November 13) has no Danfoss entry at all, and these six flaws have no CVE numbers that could be listed.


Our edge sensors watch HTTP traffic to our own web properties. We run no Danfoss decoy. Since October 1, we searched 444,104 edge-block records, 75,829 edge-canary records and 1,855 origin-honeypot records for request paths naming Danfoss, AK-SM, sm_fcgi, StoreView or the controller's xml.cgi interface, and found none. That is a measurement of our own sites, not of the internet, and says nothing about scanning of real controllers. Midnight Blue withheld the vulnerable paths, so we could not search for these specific flaws.



Indicators


None published in the sources we read. Midnight Blue, the Irish NCSC and the BSI list no addresses, domains or file hashes, and we added nothing to our feed.



Sources


If this was useful, or if it wasn't, the rating widget below takes ten seconds and is the only way we know.




Every indicator in this post is in the feed. Free.

1.58M+ IOCs, STIX 2.1 / TAXII, 88% novel vs ThreatFox, exploited-CVE leads ahead of CISA. No credit card — a free API key in 30 seconds, and you can audit every claim above against the live endpoints.


Comments

Rated 0 out of 5 stars.
No ratings yet

Add a rating
bottom of page