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First to Report: Pulsar RAT Distribution on GitHub

  • Writer: Patrick Duggan
    Patrick Duggan
  • Dec 10, 2025
  • 5 min read

Updated: Aug 11

--- title: "First to Report: Pulsar RAT Distribution on GitHub - From Code to C2 in 14 Days" slug: pulsar-rat-github-distribution-first-reporter date: 2025-12-10 author: Patrick Duggan tags: [pulsar-rat, quasar-rat, malware-analysis, github, supply-chain, pattern-38, first-reporter, threat-intel] category: Threat Intelligence featured: true ---


From Code to C2 in 14 Days


> *"Privet, Russia."* — A Minnesota cybersecurity researcher, December 2025


We found a malware distribution account on GitHub hosting Pulsar RAT and XMR cryptominer samples. We're documenting the entire investigation path because the speed from code-to-deployment matters — and the only way to stop bad actors faster is to document everything.


This is what "eating our own dog food" looks like.




The Discovery


On December 10, 2025, during a routine ThreatFox C2 sweep, we investigated the "pulsar" tag and found references to a GitHub repository hosting functional Pulsar RAT samples.


Account: `gololobovevgenij4-byte` Status: ACTIVE (as of publication) Created: August 5, 2025 User ID: 224857850



mermaid
timeline
    title Account Timeline
    Aug 5, 2025 : Account created (gololobovevgenij4-byte)
    Oct 29, 2025 : test1 repo created (probing)
    Nov 26, 2025 : quasar-modded-malware-sample (Pulsar RAT v1)
    Dec 1, 2025 : Silent-Crypto-Miner (XMR 40% takerate)
    Dec 9, 2025 : test repo (Pulsar RAT v2)
    Dec 10, 2025 : DugganUSA detection & report




The Malware


Repository 1: quasar-modded-malware-sample


| Field | Value | |-------|-------| | File | `Pulsar-Client.exe` | | Size | 978 KB | | SHA256 | `ca49f69a007de870c0ae4c9cabaa4707ad73c9735d643c7bfcdc2a4cf2ba9765` | | Classification | Pulsar RAT v2.4.5 (Quasar fork) | | Created | November 26, 2025 |


Repository 2: test


| Field | Value | |-------|-------| | File | `Pulsar-Client.exe` | | Size | 978 KB | | SHA256 | `22804099ed114502613561e19c39b08d85532366de6aa7dc7b648da51d4a7515` | | Classification | Pulsar RAT v2.4.5 (variant build) | | Created | December 9, 2025 |


Repository 3: Silent-Crypto-Miner-modded-build-Sample


| Field | Value | |-------|-------| | File | `xmr 40%.exe` | | Size | 3.4 MB | | SHA256 | `de5fcb3128ab96a7c5e45d93ed01498102aacde90552b9bffc581fa94d5c8e6a` | | Classification | XMR Cryptominer (40% attacker takerate) | | Created | December 1, 2025 |




Technical Analysis: Pulsar RAT


Pulsar RAT is a .NET-based Remote Access Trojan that extends the Quasar RAT framework. Our string analysis confirmed version 2.4.5:



costura.pulsar.common.dll.compressed|2.4.5.0|Pulsar.Common, Version=2.4.5.0


Capabilities Identified


From embedded strings:


| Module | Purpose | |--------|---------| | `Pulsar.Common.Messages.Monitoring.HVNC` | Hidden VNC (stealth remote desktop) | | `Pulsar.Common.Messages.Webcam` | Webcam capture | | `Pulsar.Common.Messages.Audio` | Microphone access | | `Pulsar.Common.Messages.Administration.RemoteShell` | Remote command execution | | `Pulsar.Common.Logging.KeyloggerService` | Keystroke logging | | `Pulsar.Client.Helper.HVNC.Chromium.OperaPatcher` | Browser credential theft | | `Pulsar.Common.Messages.ClientManagement.UAC` | UAC bypass | | `Pulsar.Common.Messages.FunStuff` | GDI effects, BSOD triggers |


Encryption Keys Found


Two SHA256 hashes embedded in the binary (likely AES encryption keys for C2 config):



6937AAA7C46A1CF5106F54609FCE156D8D08237B9B04319C5A36E1986FA22D30
F2173046D565A390F2EA722F09E8C2D93396E6D63EB8E1A453E53E97707D6982




The Distribution Network



mermaid
flowchart TD
    subgraph "Threat Actor"
        TA[gololobovevgenij4-byte<br/>User ID: 224857850<br/>Created: Aug 5, 2025]
    end


subgraph "GitHub Repositories" R1[quasar-modded-malware-sample<br/>Nov 26, 2025] R2[Silent-Crypto-Miner<br/>Dec 1, 2025] R3[test<br/>Dec 9, 2025] R4[test1<br/>Oct 29, 2025] end


subgraph "Malware Artifacts" M1[Pulsar-Client.exe v1<br/>SHA256: ca49f69a...] M2[xmr 40%.exe<br/>SHA256: de5fcb31...] M3[Pulsar-Client.exe v2<br/>SHA256: 22804099...] end


subgraph "Capabilities" C1[Remote Desktop HVNC] C2[Credential Theft] C3[Keylogging] C4[XMR Mining 40%] end


TA --> R1 & R2 & R3 & R4 R1 --> M1 R2 --> M2 R3 --> M3 M1 & M3 --> C1 & C2 & C3 M2 --> C4


style TA fill:#ff6b6b,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px style M1 fill:#ffd93d,stroke:#333 style M2 fill:#ffd93d,stroke:#333 style M3 fill:#ffd93d,stroke:#333 ```




Related Quasar/Pulsar C2 Infrastructure


From our ThreatFox sweep (December 10, 2025), 40 active Quasar RAT C2 servers in the last 7 days:


| C2 | Type | First Seen | Tags | |----|------|------------|------| | v2.slot123.jp.net | domain | Dec 10 | quasar, RAT, triage | | v3.slot123.jp.net | domain | Dec 10 | quasar, RAT, triage | | 195.24.236.68:4788 | ip:port | Dec 9 | quasar | | 3.132.231.176:15565 | ip:port | Dec 9 | AWS (AS16509) | | 190.203.50.169:443 | ip:port | Dec 9 | CANTV (Venezuela) | | 51.79.197.104:4782 | ip:port | Dec 8 | OVH | | motchilltv.bot (v2/v3) | domain | Dec 6 | quasar | | 182.123.74.218:8888 | ip:port | Dec 6 | China (AS4837) | | 27.74.249.74:8808 | ip:port | Dec 6 | Vietnam (VIETEL) |




MITRE ATT&CK Mapping



mermaid
flowchart LR
    subgraph "Initial Access"
        T1566[T1566: Phishing]
        T1189[T1189: Drive-by Compromise]
    end


subgraph "Execution" T1204[T1204: User Execution] T1059[T1059: Command Scripting] end


subgraph "Persistence" T1547[T1547: Boot/Logon Autostart] T1053[T1053: Scheduled Task] end


subgraph "Defense Evasion" T1027[T1027: Obfuscated Files] T1497[T1497: Anti-VM/Sandbox] T1548[T1548: UAC Bypass] end


subgraph "Credential Access" T1555[T1555: Credentials from Browsers] T1056[T1056: Keylogging] end


subgraph "Collection" T1113[T1113: Screen Capture] T1123[T1123: Audio Capture] T1125[T1125: Video Capture] end


subgraph "C2" T1071[T1071: Application Layer Protocol] T1573[T1573: Encrypted Channel] end


subgraph "Impact" T1496[T1496: Resource Hijacking<br/>XMR Mining] end ```




Why "First Reporter" Matters


The Problem


Most malware analysis happens *after* victims report infections. The timeline typically looks like:



Day 0: Malware uploaded to GitHub
Day 7-30: Spread via social engineering, SEO poisoning
Day 30-90: First infections detected
Day 90+: Security vendor analysis published
Day 180+: IOCs widely distributed


That's 6 months from code to defense. Unacceptable.


Microsoft pulls this feed daily. AT&T pulls this feed daily. Starlink pulls this feed daily. Get the DugganUSA STIX feed — $9/mo →


Our Approach



Day 0: Malware uploaded to GitHub (Nov 26)
Day 14: DugganUSA detection via C2 sweep (Dec 10)
Day 14: Full analysis + IOCs published (Dec 10)
Day 14: GitHub report filed (Dec 10)


14 days, not 180.




The Pattern 38 Connection


This account follows the exact Pattern 38 signature we've documented:


| Indicator | gololobovevgenij4-byte | Pattern 38 Signature | |-----------|------------------------|----------------------| | Account age | 4 months before first malware | Sleeper period | | Followers | 0 | No social proof | | Following | 0 | No engagement | | Bio | Empty | No attribution | | Repository names | Generic + "sample" | Plausible deniability | | README disclaimers | "Research purposes only" | Legal cover | | Multiple payloads | RAT + Cryptominer | Diversified monetization |




Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)


File Hashes (SHA256)



ca49f69a007de870c0ae4c9cabaa4707ad73c9735d643c7bfcdc2a4cf2ba9765  Pulsar-Client.exe (v1)
22804099ed114502613561e19c39b08d85532366de6aa7dc7b648da51d4a7515  Pulsar-Client.exe (v2)
de5fcb3128ab96a7c5e45d93ed01498102aacde90552b9bffc581fa94d5c8e6a  xmr 40%.exe


GitHub Account



Username: gololobovevgenij4-byte
User ID: 224857850
Status: ACTIVE (report filed)


Pulsar RAT Embedded Strings



Pulsar.Common.dll (v2.4.5.0)
Pulsar.Client.Helper.HVNC.ProcessController
Pulsar.Client.Logging.KeyloggerService
KeYz957jYMOdwSWT (possible mutex)
cv46qruDNSpySAepNj (possible tag)




What Happens Next


1. GitHub Report Filed — [email protected] 2. ThreatFox Submission — IOCs added to public feed 3. OTX Pulse — Published for community consumption 4. STIX Feed — Automated distribution via our free feed




The Bottom Line


> "The only way to go fast is to go well."


We document everything because documentation *is* defense. Every hour between malware upload and public IOC is an hour victims are unprotected.


This isn't about credit. It's about closing the gap between code and consequences.


DugganUSA: First to report. Always documenting.




Sources



• [ThreatMon Pulsar RAT Analysis](https://threatmon.io/pulsar-rat-technical-malware-analysis-report/)

• [Broadcom Pulsar RAT Protection Bulletin](https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/pulsar-rat-malware)

• [ThreatFox IOC Database](https://threatfox.abuse.ch/)

• [Malpedia: Quasar RAT](https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.quasar_rat)




*Generated by DugganUSA Threat Intelligence Platform* *Last updated: 2025-12-10T22:30:00Z*



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