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Follow the Followers: Mapping GitHub Malware Distribution Networks

  • Writer: Patrick Duggan
    Patrick Duggan
  • Dec 10, 2025
  • 6 min read

Updated: Aug 11

--- title: "Follow the Followers: Mapping GitHub Malware Distribution Networks" slug: follow-the-followers-github-malware-network date: 2025-12-10 author: Patrick Duggan tags: [pattern-38, github, malware-network, threat-intel, follow-the-followers, pulsar-rat, fluxen, cryptominer] category: Threat Intelligence featured: true ---


Pattern 38.5: Network Mapping via Social Graph Analysis


> *"In God we trust. All others we follow... their followers."* — DugganUSA, December 2025


When you find one malware distribution account, don't stop. Follow the followers. Check who they follow. Search for similar repository names. The GitHub API is a treasure map if you know how to read it.


Today we mapped a network of 4 malware distribution accounts, 13 repositories, and at least 5 distinct malware payloads — starting from a single Pulsar RAT sample.




The Technique: Pattern 38.5


Our Pattern 38 detection identifies individual sleeper accounts distributing malware. Pattern 38.5 extends this by mapping the distribution network:



mermaid
flowchart TD
    subgraph "Pattern 38.5: Follow the Followers"
        A[Find Initial Malware Account] --> B[Check Followers/Following]
        B --> C{Zero Social Graph?}
        C -->|Yes| D[Search Similar Repo Names]
        C -->|No| E[Investigate Connections]
        D --> F[Compare Creation Dates]
        F --> G[Check File Hashes]
        G --> H[Map Network]
        E --> H
    end


style A fill:#ff6b6b style H fill:#4ecdc4 ```


Why It Works



• Reuse payloads across multiple accounts (same hash, different names)

• Create accounts in batches (cluster creation dates)

• Use similar naming conventions (Silent-Crypto-Miner, SilentCryptoMiner, etc.)

• Avoid social connections (0 followers, 0 following — but this IS the pattern)




The Network We Found


Starting from `gololobovevgenij4-byte` (Pulsar RAT), we mapped 4 accounts:



mermaid
flowchart TD
    subgraph "Account: gololobovevgenij4-byte"
        G[gololobovevgenij4-byte<br/>ID: 224857850<br/>Created: Aug 5, 2025<br/>Followers: 0 | Following: 0]
        G1[quasar-modded-malware-sample<br/>Nov 26, 2025]
        G2[Silent-Crypto-Miner-modded-build-Sample<br/>Dec 1, 2025]
        G3[test<br/>Dec 9, 2025]
        G4[test1<br/>Oct 29, 2025]
        G --> G1 & G2 & G3 & G4
    end


subgraph "Account: Heheszon1" H[Heheszon1<br/>ID: 245615174<br/>Created: Nov 22, 2025<br/>Followers: 0 | Following: 0] H1[FluxenExecutor<br/>Nov 22, 2025] H2[FluxenGrabber<br/>Nov 22, 2025] H3[SilentCryptoMiner<br/>Nov 22, 2025] H --> H1 & H2 & H3 end


subgraph "Account: kadeen333" K[kadeen333<br/>ID: 166330105<br/>Created: Apr 7, 2024<br/>Followers: 0 | Following: 0] K1[kadeen333<br/>Apr 7, 2024] K2[Silent-Crypto-Miner<br/>Oct 10, 2025] K --> K1 & K2 end


subgraph "Account: mkaif078600" M[mkaif078600<br/>ID: 201727544<br/>Created: Mar 4, 2025<br/>Followers: 0 | Following: 0] M1[seed-phrase-generator<br/>Nov 26, 2025] M2[Silent-Crypto-Miner<br/>Nov 26, 2025] M --> M1 & M2 end


style G fill:#ff6b6b,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px style H fill:#ff6b6b,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px style K fill:#ffd93d,stroke:#333 style M fill:#ffd93d,stroke:#333 ```




The Malware Payloads


gololobovevgenij4-byte (Primary Target)


| File | SHA256 | Age | Classification | |------|--------|-----|----------------| | Pulsar-Client.exe (v1) | `ca49f69a007de870c0ae4c9cabaa4707ad73c9735d643c7bfcdc2a4cf2ba9765` | 14 days | Pulsar RAT v2.4.5 | | Pulsar-Client.exe (v2) | `22804099ed114502613561e19c39b08d85532366de6aa7dc7b648da51d4a7515` | 1 day | Pulsar RAT v2.4.5 | | xmr 40%.exe | `de5fcb3128ab96a7c5e45d93ed01498102aacde90552b9bffc581fa94d5c8e6a` | 9 days | XMR Miner (40% takerate) |


Heheszon1 (Network Discovery)


| File | SHA256 | Size | Classification | |------|--------|------|----------------| | FluxenGrabber.exe | `fae5053b24fc1ce0909d7c1718c0f70e98662097322c17db741e80fe5ee572e7` | 11 MB | SAME BINARY | | FluxenBootstrapper.exe | `fae5053b24fc1ce0909d7c1718c0f70e98662097322c17db741e80fe5ee572e7` | 11 MB | SAME BINARY | | Silent Crypto Miner Builder.exe | `fae5053b24fc1ce0909d7c1718c0f70e98662097322c17db741e80fe5ee572e7` | 11 MB | SAME BINARY |


All three Heheszon1 files are identical — same 11MB payload distributed under different names for different "use cases." Classic malware repackaging.




The Timeline



mermaid
timeline
    title Malware Distribution Network Timeline


section 2024 Apr 7 : kadeen333 account created (sleeper)


section 2025 Mar 4 : mkaif078600 account created Aug 5 : gololobovevgenij4-byte account created Oct 10 : kadeen333 uploads Silent-Crypto-Miner (6 months dormant) Oct 29 : gololobovevgenij4-byte creates test1 (probing) Nov 22 : Heheszon1 account + 3 repos in 7 minutes Nov 26 : gololobovevgenij4-byte uploads Pulsar RAT Nov 26 : mkaif078600 uploads miner + seed stealer (same day!) Dec 1 : gololobovevgenij4-byte uploads XMR miner Dec 9 : gololobovevgenij4-byte uploads Pulsar RAT v2 Dec 10 : DugganUSA detects & reports entire network ```


Key Observations


1. November 26 coordination: Two accounts uploaded malware on the same day 2. Heheszon1 speed: Account created, 3 repos with identical malware uploaded in 7 minutes 3. kadeen333 sleeper: 6 months dormant before activating 4. Zero social graph: All accounts have 0 followers and 0 following




Detection Methodology


Step 1: Initial Discovery ```bash # ThreatFox C2 sweep found "pulsar" tag # Led to gololobovevgenij4-byte GitHub account gh api users/gololobovevgenij4-byte ```


Step 2: Follow the Followers ```bash # Check social connections gh api users/gololobovevgenij4-byte/followers # Empty gh api users/gololobovevgenij4-byte/following # Empty ```


Step 3: Search Similar Repositories ```bash # Pattern matching on repository names gh search repos "Silent-Crypto-Miner" --limit 20 gh search repos "Pulsar-Client.exe" --limit 20 ```


Step 4: Profile Analysis ```bash # Check each account for Pattern 38 signatures for user in suspect1 suspect2 suspect3; do gh api users/$user | jq '{created_at, followers, following, public_repos}' done ```


Step 5: Hash Comparison ```bash # Compare file hashes across accounts curl -sL "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/..." | shasum -a 256 ```




Pattern 38 Signature Match


| Indicator | gololobovevgenij4-byte | Heheszon1 | kadeen333 | mkaif078600 | |-----------|------------------------|-----------|-----------|-------------| | Followers | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Following | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Bio | Empty | Empty | Empty | Empty | | Profile photo | Default | Default | Default | Default | | README disclaimers | "Research only" | None | SEO spam | SEO spam | | Sleeper period | 3 months | 0 (instant) | 6 months | 8 months | | Multi-payload | Yes (RAT + Miner) | Yes (3 names, 1 binary) | No | Yes (Miner + Stealer) |




IOCs Submitted


ThreatFox (First Reporter)


| Hash | Malware | Account | Status | |------|---------|---------|--------| | `ca49f69a...` | win.quasar_rat | gololobovevgenij4-byte | Submitted | | `22804099...` | win.quasar_rat | gololobovevgenij4-byte | Submitted | | `de5fcb31...` | win.coinminer | gololobovevgenij4-byte | Submitted | | `fae5053b...` | win.coinminer | Heheszon1 | Submitted |


GitHub Accounts Reported


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| Account | User ID | Repos | Status | |---------|---------|-------|--------| | gololobovevgenij4-byte | 224857850 | 4 | Reported | | Heheszon1 | 245615174 | 3 | Reported | | kadeen333 | 166330105 | 2 | Reported | | mkaif078600 | 201727544 | 2 | Reported |




Why This Matters


The Math



• Traditional approach: Find 1 account, report 1 account

• Follow the Followers: Find 1 account, map 4 accounts, report 13 repositories


4x multiplier on threat detection from a single seed.


The Speed



Day 0: Single Pulsar RAT sample identified
Day 0: Network mapped via Pattern 38.5
Day 0: 4 IOCs submitted to ThreatFox
Day 0: 4 accounts reported to GitHub


Same-day network takedown request instead of whack-a-mole over weeks.




Recommendations


For Threat Hunters


1. Never stop at one account — always search for related repositories 2. Creation date clustering — accounts created same day often work together 3. Hash everything — identical binaries under different names = same actor 4. Zero social graph IS the pattern — legitimate developers have followers


For GitHub


1. Cluster detection — flag accounts created in batches with similar repos 2. Hash deduplication — warn when identical binaries appear across accounts 3. README-only repos — SEO spam repos are often malware landing pages




The Bottom Line


> "Follow the followers. Even when there are none to follow — that's the signal."


Pattern 38.5 transforms single-target detection into network mapping. Every isolated malware account is potentially a node in a larger distribution network.


DugganUSA: First to report. Always mapping.




Full IOC List


SHA256 Hashes ``` ca49f69a007de870c0ae4c9cabaa4707ad73c9735d643c7bfcdc2a4cf2ba9765 Pulsar-Client.exe (v1) 22804099ed114502613561e19c39b08d85532366de6aa7dc7b648da51d4a7515 Pulsar-Client.exe (v2) de5fcb3128ab96a7c5e45d93ed01498102aacde90552b9bffc581fa94d5c8e6a xmr 40%.exe fae5053b24fc1ce0909d7c1718c0f70e98662097322c17db741e80fe5ee572e7 Fluxen kit (3 names) ```


GitHub Accounts ``` gololobovevgenij4-byte (ID: 224857850) Heheszon1 (ID: 245615174) kadeen333 (ID: 166330105) mkaif078600 (ID: 201727544) ```


Repositories ``` https://github.com/gololobovevgenij4-byte/quasar-modded-malware-sample https://github.com/gololobovevgenij4-byte/Silent-Crypto-Miner-modded-build-Sample https://github.com/gololobovevgenij4-byte/test https://github.com/Heheszon1/FluxenExecutor https://github.com/Heheszon1/FluxenGrabber https://github.com/Heheszon1/SilentCryptoMiner https://github.com/kadeen333/Silent-Crypto-Miner https://github.com/mkaif078600/Silent-Crypto-Miner https://github.com/mkaif078600/seed-phrase-generator ```




*Generated by DugganUSA Threat Intelligence Platform* *First reported: 2025-12-10*



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