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A Stolen Laptop's Windows Hello or BitLocker PIN Can Be Brute-Forced by Rolling Back Its Firmware TPM Counter. It Takes a Screwdriver and a Soldering Iron. The Fix Is Two More Digits

Writer: Patrick Duggan
Patrick Duggan
26 minutes ago
5 min read

Make your BitLocker startup PIN at least eight digits and your Windows Hello PIN at least six. That is the whole fix for most people, and you can set it by policy today. Researchers at TU Berlin showed that on many laptops whose TPM runs in the main processor's firmware, someone who steals the laptop and opens it up can reset the guess counter and keep guessing. A 6-digit BitLocker PIN falls in about 20 days in the worst case. An 8-digit one takes about 6 years.


This is a stolen-laptop problem, not a remote one. No network attack, no malware, and no exploitation reported anywhere outside the lab.



What the research shows


The paper is "Hello Again: Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello PINs," by Christian Werling, Matti Finder, Hans Niklas Jacob, Julian Prein, Niclas Kühnapfel and Jean-Pierre Seifert of TU Berlin, posted to arXiv on November 13 as an updated version of their ACM CCS 2026 paper.


A TPM is supposed to stop PIN guessing by counting wrong tries and locking out. A firmware TPM, the kind built into AMD and Intel processors rather than a separate chip, keeps that count on the laptop's ordinary flash memory chip. A special flash feature called RPMC (replay protected monotonic counters) is meant to stop anyone from rolling that memory back. The researchers found three ways around it:


  1. On AMD, the security processor never checks that a counter increase actually happened. A small board placed between the processor and the flash chip blocks the increase and reports success. AMD assigned CVE-2026-43613.

  2. On Winbond RPMC flash, a voltage glitch makes the chip leak the key that protects its counters, after which the attacker can forge them. On Intel systems that key stays usable across reboots.

  3. On AMD systems without RPMC, writing back an old copy of the flash with an ordinary programmer reset the counter on the two desktops they tried. The three Intel systems without RPMC they tested detected the rollback.

Their demos: a 4-digit Windows Hello PIN on an HP laptop with an AMD Ryzen AI processor, found in 57 minutes; and a 6-digit BitLocker startup PIN on a Framework 13 with an Intel Core Ultra and Winbond flash, found in under 7 minutes. Both were lucky draws. The worst-case figures from the paper are the ones to plan with:


  • Windows Hello, 4 digits: 40 hours with the rollback (69 days without it). 6 digits: 168 days.

  • BitLocker TPM+PIN, 6 digits: 20 days. 8 digits: 6 years.

The equipment is a microcontroller board that costs about $5, the researchers' custom interposer board, and a cheap remote keyboard-and-screen device to type the guesses. Their code and board designs are public on GitHub, though their README says reproducing it is "not plug-and-play." The flash chip has to be removed from the laptop's board. This is lab work, not a USB stick.



What the vendors said


  • AMD published bulletin AMD-SN-7079 on November 17 with CVE-2026-43613 (CVSS 4.0 score 5.1, physical access). It lists firmware fixes landing between November 2026 and February 2027 across Ryzen, Ryzen AI, Threadripper, Athlon, EPYC 4004/4005 and embedded parts, and says physical attacks are outside its product threat model. Your fix comes as a BIOS update from your laptop maker, not from AMD directly.

  • Intel says the work "did not demonstrate a vulnerability in an Intel component." It points at the third-party flash and says to contact your system maker. No CVE.

  • Microsoft, per the paper, rated the Windows Hello report moderate, gave it no CVE, and committed to raising the recommended minimum Hello PIN to six digits. We found no Microsoft statement of its own.

  • Winbond, per the paper, is "actively evaluating the issue," with no fix date.

The headline "days, not years" is true for a 6-digit BitLocker PIN. It isn't true for a 6-digit Hello PIN (months) or for any 8-digit PIN (years).



Who should care


People whose laptops get lost, stolen or taken: travelers, field staff, executives, journalists, anyone crossing a border with sensitive data. If your threat is a thief who wants to resell the hardware, this changes nothing. If it is someone who wants what is on the disk and can keep the laptop for a few weeks, it does.


Note that BitLocker with TPM only, no PIN, isn't what this attack targets, because there is no PIN to guess. That setup has its own weaknesses, which is why Microsoft told people in May to move to TPM plus PIN after YellowKey. Our YellowKey post. The advice still stands; make the PIN longer.



What to do


  1. Lengthen the PINs. BitLocker startup PIN: 8 digits or more (Group Policy or Intune, "Configure minimum PIN length for startup"). Windows Hello PIN: 6 or more ("Minimum PIN length" under Windows Hello for Business). The researchers' own advice: "increase your PIN length by at least two digits."

  2. Allow letters. BitLocker's "Allow enhanced PINs for startup" policy permits letters and symbols, which raises the guess count far more than one extra digit does. Check that your keyboards and recovery process can handle it before you mandate it.

  3. Install the BIOS update for AMD machines when your laptop maker ships it. Check the maker's support page against AMD-SN-7079.

  4. Find out which laptops are in scope. On AMD under Linux, the fwupd tool's security report shows "AMD SPI Replay protections." On Intel there is no software check for Winbond RPMC flash, so ask the maker.

  5. Treat a laptop that was out of your hands for days as suspect, especially if it shows signs of being opened.


How we know


We read the paper's full text on arXiv, AMD's bulletin (downloaded directly), Intel's security announcement and the researchers' GitHub README. Microsoft's position comes from the paper, not from Microsoft. We did not watch the demo videos. No indicators apply; this is a physical attack, and nothing went into our feed.



Sources


  • Werling, Finder, Jacob, Prein, Kühnapfel, Seifert (TU Berlin), "Hello Again: Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello PINs," arXiv 2611.18126v1, November 13, 2026 (updated version of the ACM CCS 2026 paper).

  • AMD, "RPMC Increment Suppression Vulnerability," AMD-SN-7079, CVE-2026-43613, November 17, 2026.

  • Intel, security announcement INTEL-2026-11-16-001, "Hello Again," November 16, 2026.

  • github.com/mattifinder/rpmc_attacks (README).

  • The Hacker News, "New Attack Bypasses TPM Lockout to Crack Windows Hello and BitLocker PINs in Days, Not Years," November 18, 2026.



Every indicator in this post is in the feed. Free.

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