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The Third-Party Script Breach Scott Helme Flagged Rides in Through Optimizely Snippets. The Payload Swaps Crypto Wallets, Skims Cards and Takes Cookies. Block These Domains Now

Writer: Patrick Duggan
Patrick Duggan
1 hour ago
6 min read
The Third-Party Script Breach Scott Helme Flagged Rides in Through Optimizely Snippets. The Payload Swaps Crypto Wallets, Skims Cards and Takes Cookies. Block These Domains Now

Block these domains at your DNS resolver, proxy and Content Security Policy now: 1688360[.]cc, 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu, p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu and q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu. If your site loads Optimizely, open your Optimizely project's Project JavaScript (the custom code that runs on every page) today and look for anything that adds a script from a domain you do not own. If you visited a large site on Monday, November 16, 2026, and copied a crypto wallet address from it, check the address you actually pasted before you send anything.


On Monday afternoon Scott Helme, who runs Report URI, posted on X that he was tracking "a breach of a 3rd-party JS host impacting hundreds of high value websites," then that 186 sites were confirmed infected, that crypto users looked like the target, and a list of seven domains to block. He did not name the host. This post adds what public scan data shows about how the script gets onto the pages, what it does once it is there, and one more domain that was not on his list.



How it gets onto the page: each site's own Optimizely snippet


urlscan.io, a public service that loads a page in a browser and records every request it makes, holds 206 scans touching 1688360[.]cc as of 21:30 UTC Monday. Sixteen of them are scans of well-known sites rather than of the attacker's domain: www.bbc.com, www.foxnews.com, edition.cnn.com, www.zoom.com, www.salesforce.com, about.gitlab.com, www.klm.com, www.stamps.com, www.smartsheet.com, www.hootsuite.com, www.tricentis.com, www.americangirl.com, www.scheels.com and three property-management portals.


We opened the full scan records for four of them: Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab and BBC. In all four, the request for https://1688360[.]cc/track.js was started by that company's own Optimizely file on cdn.optimizely.com, a different project file for each company. In the Zoom file, the loader sits in the Project JavaScript field and is five statements long: create a script element, point it at 1688360[.]cc/track.js, mark it async, append it to the page, swallow any error.


Four unrelated companies, four separate Optimizely projects, the same injected code. That points at something they share: either Optimizely's own platform or an access path common to those accounts. Which of those it is has not been established, and we have not seen a statement from Optimizely.


Update, 22:45 UTC Monday. By 22:40 UTC urlscan held 219 scans touching 1688360[.]cc, and the list of affected sites had grown to include www.optimizely.com itself, first seen at 15:45 UTC and loaded through Optimizely's own project file, cdn.optimizely.com/js/26942930964.js. Optimizely's own marketing site carrying the same loader as its customers makes a platform-side compromise more likely than a set of separately breached customer accounts, though it is still not confirmed. Financial sites in the new scans include IG (www.ig.com, first seen 14:40 UTC), HSBC Insurance Singapore and Mutual of Omaha, each through its own Optimizely project file. Others added: American Eagle, Change.org, UNICEF USA, TSN, Virgin Media O2 and Air France's Italian site. The Hacker News discussion of the incident is under the title "Optimizely Compromised."


Chase, Bank of America and Wells Fargo also had online banking problems on Monday. We found nothing connecting those outages to this: none of the urlscan scans of chase.com, bankofamerica.com, wellsfargo.com or usbank.com since November 15 touched the attacker domains, and none since November 1 loaded Optimizely. That is a handful of scans per bank, so it is an absence of evidence, not proof. The banks have not given a cause.



Cleaned up over Monday evening


We fetched the same four files again from the public Optimizely CDN (not from the attacker's servers). At about 21:25 UTC Monday, Zoom's and GitLab's still contained the loader, and Salesforce's and BBC's no longer did; those two carried new last-modified times of 20:23 and 21:07 UTC. By 21:39 UTC, Zoom's and GitLab's were clean too, republished at 21:38 and 21:29 UTC. The infected Zoom file had carried a last-modified time of 11:20 UTC Monday. That is the time Optimizely last rebuilt the file, not proof the loader was added then; it may have been there longer. A clean file on the CDN does not clean a browser that already ran the script or a cookie already sent, and other affected sites may still be serving it.



What track.js does


We read the file as text from urlscan's stored copy (SHA256 f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40, 29,882 bytes, as served to the Zoom scan). We did not run it. It does four things.


  1. Swaps wallet addresses. It carries a regular expression for nine kinds of cryptocurrency address and replaces any match with the attacker's address of the same kind. It does this in the visible page, in anything you copy to the clipboard, and inside the page's own outgoing fetch and XMLHttpRequest calls, so a payment form can submit the attacker's address even if the screen looks right.

  2. Skims payment cards. It posts the card number, expiry and security code to 1688360[.]cc/card.php.

  3. Takes cookies and screenshots. It posts the page's cookies (up to 8,000 characters), the URL and an html2canvas screenshot to 1688360[.]cc/hit.php. Any session cookie a site did not mark HttpOnly was readable, so the exposure is wider than crypto users.

  4. Loads a second stage on phones. On touch devices it adds https://5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js with a "channel code" attribute. That domain was not in Helme's list. It resolves to the same Google Cloud address as p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu, 34.96.213.201, and one public hosts list on GitHub already carries it. The file also references eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu/boot.js and a page at eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu/JIUJIU888/weifile.html.


The attacker's wallets


These are the replacement addresses hardcoded in the file. Exchanges and wallet providers can screen for them.


Ethereum and EVM chains: 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e. TRON: THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa. Bitcoin: 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW. TON: UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p, and in raw form 0:2033556a49942224b486e70fa8beeaeae4265dc4b10adffec2326c002d30397b. Solana: FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n. Litecoin: ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5. Bitcoin Cash: qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58. Dogecoin: DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5.


The Bitcoin address received five payments on Monday, between 11:13 and 19:38 UTC, totalling 0.0853 BTC, per the public blockchain.info record. We cannot tell from the chain whether any given payment came from a victim. The Ethereum address was already active on November 12, so it was prepared before this run. We could not read the TRON address; the explorer rate-limited us.



Infrastructure


1688360[.]cc resolved to 136.113.106.136 (Google Cloud) with Cloudflare name servers. Three of the .icu domains, eil786npto9u5bq, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1 and gm38duxoihbmy5o, resolved to 34.87.36.58 (Google Cloud, Singapore). l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu sits behind Cloudflare. q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu did not resolve. Every .icu domain that resolved used the name servers a.share-dns.com and b.share-dns.net. Lookups were made through 1.1.1.1 at about 21:00 UTC Monday. Google Cloud addresses get reassigned, so treat the IPs as current, not permanent.



What is not known


Whether Optimizely itself was breached or a shared access path was. Whether every one of Helme's 186 sites came in through Optimizely; we checked four. How many people lost money or cards. Whether the session cookies taken have been used. Who is behind it; the wallet set and the "JIUJIU888" path are not an attribution.



What to do


If you run a site: check your Optimizely Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code, remove anything you did not write, rotate the Optimizely account credentials and API tokens, and review the account's change history from November 1 on. Add the domains above to your CSP block list, or better, run a CSP that allows only script hosts you name. PCI DSS 4.0.1 requirements 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 exist for exactly this: an inventory of the scripts on your payment pages and an alert when they change. If card entry happened on an affected page, treat those cards as exposed. Expire sessions for users who were active on affected pages Monday.


If you are a user: compare any wallet address you pasted Monday with the one the recipient gave you, character by character. If you entered a card on a large site Monday, watch the statement.


If you defend a network: block the eight domains and look in DNS and proxy logs for lookups of them since Monday morning. A lookup means a browser in your network ran the script.



How we know, and what we did


Every claim above comes from public data: Helme's posts on X, urlscan.io scan records and stored responses (read with our urlscan key), the public Optimizely CDN, public DNS and the public Bitcoin and Ethereum ledgers. Before today none of these domains, addresses or wallets were in our corpus, and our correlation graph had nothing next to them. None of DugganUSA's own sites use Optimizely.


All eight domains, the three Google Cloud addresses and the track.js hash are now in the DugganUSA feed under source manual-batch-helme-js-host-breach-2026-11-16, each credited to Helme or to our own extraction. The domains are at confidence 85, except q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu at 80 because it does not resolve. The IPs are at 65, below our own edge shield's floor of 80, because they are shared cloud addresses; pull ips.csv with min_confidence=80 to leave them out. All ten writes were read back from the index.


Credit for finding this belongs to Scott Helme. What this post adds is the Optimizely delivery path, the payload behavior, the fifth domain and the wallets.



Sources


Scott Helme on X, @Scott_Helme, posts of Monday, November 16, 2026. urlscan.io search for domain:1688360.cc and the scan records for www.zoom.com, www.salesforce.com/eu, about.gitlab.com/de-de and www.bbc.com/news. Optimizely CDN files cdn.optimizely.com/js/6395285578973184.js (Zoom), /js/5113954737848320.js (GitLab), /js/24776530927.js (Salesforce) and /public/4621041136/s/bbcx_prod.js (BBC). blockchain.info and BlockCypher address records. PCI Security Standards Council, PCI DSS v4.0.1.




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