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Pattern 43: The Password is in the Filename

  • Writer: Patrick Duggan
    Patrick Duggan
  • Nov 26, 2025
  • 3 min read

How Russian Malware Distributors Defeat Automated Scanning


Soundtrack



Today I discovered a new malware distribution pattern on GitHub. It's different enough from Pattern 38 (the Stealc/Rhadamanthys campaign we've been tracking) that it deserves its own number: Pattern 43.


The Discovery


While hunting for new threats beyond our Pattern 38 network, I searched GitHub for recent issues with suspicious file attachments. One result stood out:



Repository: skarleta-coder/Maj_Cheker_V1.0.exe
Issue Title: https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23686035/Maj_proverka.zip

The issue title is literally a download URL. That's not normal.


The Account


| Attribute | Value | |-----------|-------| | Username | skarleta-coder | | Created | November 15, 2025 (11 days ago) | | Repos | 3 | | Followers | 0 |


Brand new account. Zero social proof. Repository name includes `.exe`. Classic malware distribution profile.


The Payload


Downloaded the ZIP. Here's what was inside:



Archive:  Maj_proverka.zip
  Length      Date    Time    Name
---------  ---------- -----   ----
       14  11-22-2025 03:57   PASSWORD: 9295
  3292160  11-22-2025 03:57   Majproverka.exe

The password is stored as a filename inside the ZIP.


This is genius (evil genius, but still). Here's why:


1. Defeats automated scanning - VirusTotal can't extract password-protected ZIPs automatically 2. Human-readable - Victim sees "PASSWORD: 9295" and knows exactly what to type 3. No external communication - Password doesn't need to be sent via Telegram/Discord


The Malware


Extracted with password `9295`:



File: Majproverka.exe
Size: 3,292,160 bytes
Type: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Packer: UPX compressed
SHA256: 4ac33e95d7d1bf205c8bd021886a8edc5d405d65389edb3b0c65d62c12ace47d

VirusTotal Status: NOT IN DATABASE


This is a fresh sample. Never submitted. The password protection worked - automated systems never saw the actual executable.


Why This is Pattern 43 (Not Pattern 38)


| TTP | Pattern 38 | Pattern 43 | |-----|------------|------------| | Distribution | Issue comment spam | Dedicated malware repos | | ZIP Protection | None | Password (in filename) | | VT Detections | 18-29 (known) | 0 (fresh) | | Naming | English | Russian ("proverka" = verification) | | Target | Legitimate repos | Self-hosted repos |


Different operator. Different technique. Same goal: steal your credentials.


The Judge Dredd Response


We posted a warning directly on the malware repository:


> SECURITY ALERT: This repository distributes malware > > SHA256: `4ac33e95d7d1bf205c8bd021886a8edc5d405d65389edb3b0c65d62c12ace47d` > Type: PE32 executable (GUI), UPX compressed > Evasion: Password-protected ZIP (password: 9295)


Link: https://github.com/skarleta-coder/Maj_Cheker_V1.0.exe/issues/4


Yes, we opened an issue on a malware repository to warn potential victims. Purple team action.


The Network


While investigating, we also found:



• Reavy8 - Another new account (5 days old) distributing `DLL-Injector-With-Driver`

• chrisj21 - Follow-bot with 32,108 following and only 1 repository (supports Pattern 38 infrastructure)


All reported to GitHub Security.


Detection Signature



• Repository name contains `.exe`

• Account less than 30 days old

• Zero followers

• ZIP files with "PASSWORD" in internal filenames

• Russian naming conventions (proverka, loader, checker)


We've added Pattern 43 detection to our automated scanner. It's now running in production.


IOCs



# Pattern 43 - Russian Password-Protected Malware

The Lesson


Password-protected ZIPs with the password in the filename. It's so simple it's embarrassing that it works.


Automated scanning looks at the ZIP, sees it's encrypted, moves on. Human victim opens the ZIP, sees the password file, extracts the malware, runs it.


The attackers are adapting. Pattern 38 got 4 accounts suspended, so they're trying new techniques. Password protection defeats the automated defenses that caught them last time.


We adapt too.




STIX Feed: https://analytics.dugganusa.com/api/v1/stix-feed


Pattern 43 IOCs are now in the feed. Free for everyone.


*"The password is in the filename. The call is coming from inside the house."*




DugganUSA LLC November 26, 2025


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