Pattern 43: The Password is in the Filename
- Patrick Duggan
- Nov 26, 2025
- 3 min read
How Russian Malware Distributors Defeat Automated Scanning
Soundtrack
Today I discovered a new malware distribution pattern on GitHub. It's different enough from Pattern 38 (the Stealc/Rhadamanthys campaign we've been tracking) that it deserves its own number: Pattern 43.
The Discovery
While hunting for new threats beyond our Pattern 38 network, I searched GitHub for recent issues with suspicious file attachments. One result stood out:
Repository: skarleta-coder/Maj_Cheker_V1.0.exe
Issue Title: https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23686035/Maj_proverka.zip
The issue title is literally a download URL. That's not normal.
The Account
| Attribute | Value | |-----------|-------| | Username | skarleta-coder | | Created | November 15, 2025 (11 days ago) | | Repos | 3 | | Followers | 0 |
Brand new account. Zero social proof. Repository name includes `.exe`. Classic malware distribution profile.
The Payload
Downloaded the ZIP. Here's what was inside:
Archive: Maj_proverka.zip
Length Date Time Name
--------- ---------- ----- ----
14 11-22-2025 03:57 PASSWORD: 9295
3292160 11-22-2025 03:57 Majproverka.exe
The password is stored as a filename inside the ZIP.
This is genius (evil genius, but still). Here's why:
1. Defeats automated scanning - VirusTotal can't extract password-protected ZIPs automatically 2. Human-readable - Victim sees "PASSWORD: 9295" and knows exactly what to type 3. No external communication - Password doesn't need to be sent via Telegram/Discord
The Malware
Extracted with password `9295`:
File: Majproverka.exe
Size: 3,292,160 bytes
Type: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Packer: UPX compressed
SHA256: 4ac33e95d7d1bf205c8bd021886a8edc5d405d65389edb3b0c65d62c12ace47d
VirusTotal Status: NOT IN DATABASE
This is a fresh sample. Never submitted. The password protection worked - automated systems never saw the actual executable.
Why This is Pattern 43 (Not Pattern 38)
| TTP | Pattern 38 | Pattern 43 | |-----|------------|------------| | Distribution | Issue comment spam | Dedicated malware repos | | ZIP Protection | None | Password (in filename) | | VT Detections | 18-29 (known) | 0 (fresh) | | Naming | English | Russian ("proverka" = verification) | | Target | Legitimate repos | Self-hosted repos |
Different operator. Different technique. Same goal: steal your credentials.
The Judge Dredd Response
We posted a warning directly on the malware repository:
> SECURITY ALERT: This repository distributes malware > > SHA256: `4ac33e95d7d1bf205c8bd021886a8edc5d405d65389edb3b0c65d62c12ace47d` > Type: PE32 executable (GUI), UPX compressed > Evasion: Password-protected ZIP (password: 9295)
Link: https://github.com/skarleta-coder/Maj_Cheker_V1.0.exe/issues/4
Yes, we opened an issue on a malware repository to warn potential victims. Purple team action.
The Network
While investigating, we also found:
• Reavy8 - Another new account (5 days old) distributing `DLL-Injector-With-Driver`
• chrisj21 - Follow-bot with 32,108 following and only 1 repository (supports Pattern 38 infrastructure)
All reported to GitHub Security.
Detection Signature
• Repository name contains `.exe`
• Account less than 30 days old
• Zero followers
• ZIP files with "PASSWORD" in internal filenames
• Russian naming conventions (proverka, loader, checker)
We've added Pattern 43 detection to our automated scanner. It's now running in production.
IOCs
# Pattern 43 - Russian Password-Protected MalwareThe Lesson
Password-protected ZIPs with the password in the filename. It's so simple it's embarrassing that it works.
Automated scanning looks at the ZIP, sees it's encrypted, moves on. Human victim opens the ZIP, sees the password file, extracts the malware, runs it.
The attackers are adapting. Pattern 38 got 4 accounts suspended, so they're trying new techniques. Password protection defeats the automated defenses that caught them last time.
We adapt too.
STIX Feed: https://analytics.dugganusa.com/api/v1/stix-feed
Pattern 43 IOCs are now in the feed. Free for everyone.
*"The password is in the filename. The call is coming from inside the house."*
DugganUSA LLC November 26, 2025




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