CISA Says Puppet Enterprise CVE-2026-115731 Is Exploited. Upgrade to 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1 or 2026.0.1 by Tuesday, Dec 1. One Agent Report Can Run Code on the Server That Configures Your Fleet.
If you run Puppet Enterprise, upgrade to 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1 or 2026.0.1 and then restart the Puppet Server. Perforce's own CVE record says the fix is "a release that bundles puppet-agent 8.22.2 or 9.1.3 (Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1, or 2026.0.1)" and that you must "restart puppet server so the fixed code is loaded." An upgrade without the restart leaves the vulnerable code running.
If you run the open source fork OpenVox, the fixed releases are OpenVox Server 9.2.0 and 8.18.0, and OpenVox Agent 9.3.0 and 8.32.0, per the OpenVox project's advisory.
CISA added CVE-2026-115731 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog today, Tuesday, November 17, 2026. The due date for federal civilian agencies is Tuesday, December 1, 2026. Two weeks. Everyone else should treat that as the outside edge, not the target.
If you cannot patch today, do two things now. First, turn off certificate autosigning that does not strongly verify the requester. Second, make sure the Puppet Server port (8140 by default) is reachable only from the networks your managed nodes live on, never from the internet.
Why a Puppet bug is a fleet bug
Puppet is the thing that tells your servers what they should look like. Agents on every managed machine check in with the Puppet primary server, fetch their configuration, apply it, and send back a report of what changed. The server compiles what every node runs. It holds the certificate authority that decides which machines are trusted.
So the Puppet primary is not one more server. Whoever controls it can push configuration, packages and commands to every machine it manages, usually as root. A compromised Puppet primary is root on the fleet.
This flaw lives exactly in that check-in loop. It is in the code that reads the reports agents send back.
What is confirmed
These statements come from the primary records: the CISA KEV entry, the CVE record that Perforce published as the assigning authority, the NVD entry, and the OpenVox project's GitHub advisory.
The flaw. Perforce's CVE record describes "deserialization of untrusted data in the report-processing code of Puppet, as used by Puppet Server," which "allows a client that holds any CA-signed agent certificate to execute arbitrary code on the Puppet Server as its service user by submitting a report containing a crafted rich-data type via PUT request." The weaknesses listed are CWE-502 (deserialization of untrusted data) and CWE-94 (code injection).
The score. Perforce rates it CVSS 4.0 9.4, Critical. The vector says network attack, low complexity, low privileges required (an agent certificate), no user interaction, and high impact on the server and on the systems downstream of it.
How "authenticated" becomes "unauthenticated". The attacker needs an agent certificate signed by your Puppet CA. Perforce's own wording: "Where the certificate authority autosigns requests without strong verification, an unauthenticated network attacker can obtain such a certificate." The OpenVox advisory calls autosign "common for enterprise deployment." If your CA signs any request that arrives, the certificate requirement is not a barrier.
What the attacker gets. The OpenVox advisory says the payload runs as the puppet user and that "code execution as puppet gives access to the CA signing key." With the CA key, an attacker can sign their own certificates, which the advisory says "could enable direct command execution on other hosts if certain kinds of orchestration is configured."
Who is affected. Perforce's record lists Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.0 up to but not including 2023.8.13, 2025.0.0 up to but not including 2025.12.1, and 2026.0.0 up to but not including 2026.0.1. The OpenVox advisory lists OpenVox Server up to 9.1.0 and up to 8.17.0, and OpenVox Agent up to 9.2.0 and up to 8.31.1, and states that the same flaw affects Puppet Enterprise.
The exploit is public. The OpenVox advisory, published November 3, 2026, includes a full working report that runs a shell command on the server, sent to the agent report endpoint with a valid client certificate. The finder is credited in that advisory as GitHub user alain-neodyme.
The timeline. The CVE record was reserved October 23 and published November 3, 2026. The OpenVox advisory went public the same day. CISA marked exploitation "active" in its CVE enrichment at 18:42 UTC on November 17, and the KEV entry is dated November 17. That is fourteen days from a public exploit to a federal exploitation listing.
What is not known
Who is exploiting it, and against whom. CISA's entry does not say, and we found no public report of in-the-wild exploitation from a vendor, researcher or victim. As of this writing, CISA is the only source for the exploitation claim. Several aggregator pages we checked still said "not in KEV" because they were written before today's addition.
Whether ransomware crews are using it. KEV lists known ransomware campaign use as "Unknown."
Whether attackers needed autosign. The KEV listing does not say whether the exploitation CISA knows of used an autosigned certificate, a stolen agent certificate, or an already-compromised managed node. Any of those reaches the same endpoint.
The Perforce advisory text itself. The link in the KEV entry goes to a Perforce support portal page that did not render for our automated reader. The affected and fixed versions above come from the CVE record that Perforce published as the assigning authority, which is the vendor's own data, but we could not read the portal page's prose, and it may hold guidance we have not seen.
Indicators. None published in the sources we read: no IP addresses, domains or file hashes appear in the KEV entry, NVD, the CVE record or the OpenVox advisory. We added nothing to our feed for this flaw.
What to do
Upgrade. Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1 or 2026.0.1. OpenVox Server 9.2.0 or 8.18.0 and OpenVox Agent 9.3.0 or 8.32.0. Then restart the Puppet Server service.
Check autosign. If autosign is set to true, or autosign.conf accepts broad name patterns, the certificate requirement is gone. Use policy-based autosigning with a pre-shared secret, or sign by hand.
Fence port 8140. The Puppet Server should answer only the networks your managed nodes are on.
Look for signs it already happened. These are our suggestions, not vendor guidance. Review the certificates your CA signed since November 3 and ask whether you expected each one. Search stored agent reports for event data containing an Object type definition with a RubyMethod annotation, which is the shape of the public payload. Look for processes started by the puppet service user that Puppet does not normally start.
If you find a compromise, assume the CA key is gone. A stolen CA key means any certificate it signed can no longer be trusted, so plan for rebuilding the CA and re-enrolling agents, not only patching.
How we know, and what our edge saw
The KEV dates come from CISA's KEV JSON feed, catalog version 2026.11.17, downloaded today. The weekdays come from the system calendar, not from press reports. The CVE details come from the NVD and CVE.org APIs, and the exploit details from the OpenVox advisory on GitHub.
Our edge check is UNKNOWN. We tried to scan our edge telemetry for the Puppet report and certificate endpoint paths twice today, and both attempts failed before reading any data because the scan host was unreachable. That is not "we saw nothing." It is "we could not look."
It is also a weak instrument for this flaw even when it works. Our edge sits in front of our web properties, and we do not run a Puppet Server. Puppet traffic normally goes to port 8140 with client certificates, so a probe for this flaw against our sites would at best show inventory scanning, never exploitation of a real Puppet server. Our public exploit tracker also had no repository for this CVE, because the working payload sits inside a project advisory rather than a standalone repository.
We have no detection lead here and claim none. CISA's listing is the news, and the fix is two weeks old.
Sources
CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, entry CVE-2026-115731, date added November 17, 2026, due December 1, 2026: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-115731
NVD, CVE-2026-115731 (published November 3, 2026; CVSS 4.0 9.4 from Perforce; CISA SSVC exploitation "active"): https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115731
CVE.org record published by Perforce as the assigning authority (affected and fixed versions, solution text): https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-115731
Perforce advisory "Report Deserialization Code Execution" (linked from KEV; the page did not render for our reader): https://portal.perforce.com/s/cve/a91Qi000003IaHpIAK/report-deserialization-code-execution
OpenVox project advisory GHSA-ffr6-rwpm-p5wq, "Authenticated RCE on OpenVox server via Event Deserialization," published November 3, 2026: https://github.com/OpenVoxProject/openvox/security/advisories/GHSA-ffr6-rwpm-p5wq
GitHub global advisory GHSA-4pxx-8frq-9r4j: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4pxx-8frq-9r4j
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