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GitDoor and GraphDoor Hide Their C2 in GitHub and SharePoint. You Cannot Block the Platform, So Hunt the Process That Talks to It

Writer: Patrick Duggan
Patrick Duggan
26 minutes ago
8 min read

Do three things today. First, find every MeshCentral agent on your network and confirm IT put it there: this campaign started with one that nobody admits installing. Second, look for programs that are not browsers, Git clients or developer tools calling api.github.com, graph.microsoft.com, login.microsoftonline.com or Ably's rest.ably.io: in this campaign those callers were a Sandboxie launcher, a Python runtime, a Java runtime and a Sysinternals zoom tool. Third, block the attacker-owned addresses and file hashes at the end of this post. Do not block GitHub, SharePoint or Microsoft Graph. The attacker is counting on you not being able to.


Kaspersky's Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) published a two-part report on Tuesday, November 17, 2026, on a campaign it calls Operation ShadowCloud. Researchers Saurabh Sharma and Noushin Shabab describe two new backdoors: GitDoor, which takes its orders from a GitHub repository, and GraphDoor, which takes them from a SharePoint document library through the Microsoft Graph API. The Hacker News covered it the same day. Everything below comes from Kaspersky's two posts unless we say otherwise.


This is the same idea we wrote about in Backdoor Turn got the headlines; ConvoC2 is the version anyone can run: command and control hidden inside infrastructure you already trust. The answer has not changed. You stop asking "which server is bad" and start asking "which program on this machine has any business talking to that service."



What is confirmed


Who was hit. Kaspersky says: "We found victims in Asia and Africa, primarily within the government sector." It does not give a victim count. The infection it walked through started inside a Taiwanese organization.


How it got in, as far as anyone knows. Kaspersky found "two separate instances of the MeshCentral Agent" inside that Taiwanese organization. MeshCentral is a legitimate open-source remote-management tool. "The exact entry point that let the attackers install the agent is unknown, but evidence points to the reuse of a prior infection already present on the network." The agent was hard-coded to call wss://27.102.66[.]162:443/agent.ashx, and the operator used it to drop three files: a legitimate signed program, a malicious DLL for that program to load by mistake (DLL sideloading), and an encrypted file named config.ini holding the backdoor.


The pairs Kaspersky names: the Sandboxie launcher start.exe with SbieDll.dll; a Python program (pythonw.exe, and in one case one renamed dtsapo4service.exe) with python39.dll; the OpenJDK javaw.exe with jli.dll; and Sysinternals ZoomIt (zoomit.exe), "which the attackers started as a Windows service", with WINMM.dll. One install sat directly in C:\Windows\System32 (start.exe, sbiedll.dll, config.ini). Another sat in C:\Windows\System32\dts\pc\apo4x\.


GitDoor uses GitHub as a mailbox. It decrypts "its repository URL, the personal access token, the User-Agent string, and the necessary HTTP headers," then uses two repositories under one GitHub account: "/repos/LatonyCharnleyaW/Havo: download the command data and plug-ins" and "/repos/LatonyCharnleyaW/Trix: upload the victim's information and the command result." Each new victim opens a GitHub issue in Trix titled "problem [GUID]" with the body "code [victim unique code]", then keeps adding and removing a "bug" label on that issue as a heartbeat while it polls Havo for files whose names contain its victim code. Results go back as files named like main.(victim code).(four characters).js, with extensions such as .kmap for keylogger output and .pmap for proxy output, committed with the message "commit from INSOMNIA". Victim information is also copied to Ably, a commercial real-time messaging service, at rest.ably.io.


GraphDoor uses SharePoint the same way. It authenticates as an application, not a user: "This call authenticates the malicious application – not a user – and returns an access token that the backdoor later uses to communicate with the Microsoft Graph API." The token request goes to login.microsoftonline.com under the tenant ID 8f50c589-a4d6-4df4-95bb-2fb7f5983fe5 using the client-credentials grant. It then writes a file named main.(victim code).js.map, "masquerading as a JavaScript source map file," to a document library on buildersemp.sharepoint[.]com, and reads its plug-ins and commands from SharePoint lists on the same site. Kaspersky's indicator list names a second site, cskautogo.sharepoint[.]com. The client ID and secret are redacted in the report.


What they can do once in. Kaspersky counts a file manager, keylogger, two kinds of proxy (a modified copy of the open-source Erfrp reverse proxy, and SOCKS5 tunneled through Ably), and in-memory loading of shellcode and COFF objects. The shellcode modules it recovered include process injection, service and scheduled-task creation, registry editing, adding local user accounts, Chrome and Edge cookie theft with CookieKatz, Mimikatz credential dumping from LSASS and the SAM database, screenshots, a WhatsApp database key extractor, a PetitPotam-style NTLM coercion module, and file upload to upload.gofile[.]io.


The GitHub accounts. Kaspersky lists nine GitHub accounts used across samples: LatonyCharnleyaW, StevenDFournier, JeneLeo, VenoraKlanimU, AlexandaJazzmynwC, FloraineSuvitC, bvgarciajocelynxccZ, Eclemensadolph1n and aYulysseserinYtas. It marks LatonyCharnleyaW's two repositories "Repository Taken Down." The earliest creation date it lists is September 3, 2024 (StevenDFournier), and five of the nine are dated November 19 to December 5, 2025. Kaspersky: "the threat actor has been preparing the infrastructure of this operation since at least the end of 2024."


Proxy and Cobalt Strike infrastructure. Kaspersky lists 22 proxy servers that GraphDoor's proxy plug-ins were configured to use, and two domains, twnic[.]top and ekmt[.]tw, that "were also used as Cobalt Strike beacon C2 servers. The beacon samples were deployed on victim machines infected with the GraphDoor backdoor."



Who is behind it, and how sure anyone is


Kaspersky does not name an actor. In its words: "Currently, we lack sufficient information to definitively attribute this activity to a specific threat group." It reports overlaps with two groups it describes as Chinese-speaking, FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle: "On several victim systems, these groups shared the same staging directories as the GitDoor backdoor, with their implants deployed within a one-day window of GitDoor deployment. While this does not prove a direct link, it suggests that a Chinese-speaking group may be developing and/or utilizing the GitDoor and GraphDoor backdoors."


The two examples it gives: a FamousSparrow loader in %ProgramData%\excint\ dated March 6, 2026, next to a GitDoor loader in %ProgramData%\excint\sg\ dated March 5; and a CopperTurtle PLEAD RAT launcher in C:\Program Files\PDF24\ dated May 3, next to a GitDoor loader in the same folder dated May 4.


The Hacker News adds that Sophos tracks an overlapping cluster as Bronze Sandcastle and links CopperTurtle to BlackTech. Kaspersky's post says only that "Sophos touched on a fragment of this campaign." We did not read Sophos's brief, so treat that name as the press summary, not something we checked.


So: shared folders, one day apart, on the same victims. That is a real clue. It is not an attribution, and Kaspersky does not call it one.



What is not known


  • The way in. Nobody has said how the MeshCentral agent got onto the first machine. "Reuse of a prior infection" means someone was already inside.

  • How many victims. Kaspersky gives regions and a sector, not a number.

  • Whose SharePoint sites those are. The report does not say whether buildersemp and cskautogo are tenants the attacker created or real organizations' tenants it took over. Until someone says, do not assume the organizations behind those names are guilty of anything.

  • Whether the other eight GitHub accounts are still up. Kaspersky says LatonyCharnleyaW's repositories were taken down. It does not say for the rest, and we did not check.

  • Whether every proxy address is attacker-owned. Most sit at budget hosting providers. One, 122.147.252[.]16, is on a Taiwanese ISP (AS9919), which could be a rented server or a hijacked customer machine. One more, 38.52.17[.]113, is listed under an electric cooperative's network (AS33152) right after 38.54.17[.]113 on a Hong Kong host. That looks like a typo to us, so we left 38.52.17[.]113 out of our feed. If you block it yourself, know that it may belong to a utility customer.


What to do


Do not block the platforms. github.com, api.github.com, graph.microsoft.com, login.microsoftonline.com, *.sharepoint.com and Ably's domains carry huge volumes of legitimate traffic. Blocking them breaks your business. Blocking a tenant name such as buildersemp.sharepoint.com at your proxy is reasonable, if your proxy can see the host.


Inventory remote-management agents. List every MeshCentral (meshagent), and while you are there every other remote-access tool, and match each to a ticket. Alert on any agent talking to a server you do not run. Kaspersky's closing advice: "introducing such legitimate tools to an environment should be treated as a suspicious event."


Hunt the callers, not the destination. In your endpoint tool's network events (Microsoft Defender for Endpoint's DeviceNetworkEvents, for example), look for connections to api.github.com, graph.microsoft.com, login.microsoftonline.com, rest.ably.io or main.pusher.ably.net whose initiating process is start.exe, pythonw.exe, javaw.exe, zoomit.exe, dtsapo4service.exe or anything running out of C:\Windows\System32\dts\ or %ProgramData%\excint\. Any of those is worth a look by itself. A Sysinternals tool running as a service and making HTTPS calls to Microsoft Graph is not normal on any machine we know of.


Look for sideloading pairs. A legitimate program in an unusual folder with one of these DLLs next to it: SbieDll.dll, python39.dll, jli.dll, WINMM.dll or libcef.dll, plus a config.ini. GraphDoor's move plug-in also knows these loader names, so include them in the hunt: python311.dll, python38.dll, python33.dll, krita.dll, nvdaHelperRemote.dll, AppVIsvSubsystems64.dll, CoreFoundation.dll, vcruntime140.dll, msvcp140.dll, snmpapi.dll, MSIMG32.dll, version.dll, sqlite.dll and msedge_elf.dll. Those are common names; what matters is a copy sitting outside the folder its program normally lives in.


Check for the files they leave. From Kaspersky: keystrokes in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Cache\logs.dat; a %APPDATA%\log.lock file that turns the keylogger on at startup; a C:\ProgramData\Intel_Log\ folder with a GUID-named subfolder; named pipes \\.\pipe\p followed by a process ID, and \\.\pipe\MyInputPipe; an event named Global\ExitEvent; and a Mimikatz build named imzimzgo.


If you can inspect TLS at your proxy, these are the request-level signs Kaspersky gives. Token requests to login.microsoftonline.com/8f50c589-a4d6-4df4-95bb-2fb7f5983fe5/oauth2/v2.0/token with grant_type=client_credentials. That tenant ID is not yours, and a workstation asking for an app-only token in someone else's tenant is the tell. Graph calls to /v1.0/sites/buildersemp.sharepoint.com or cskautogo.sharepoint.com. GitHub API calls to /repos/LatonyCharnleyaW/ or any of the other eight accounts above. The User-Agent Chrome/122.0.6261.96 from a program that is not Chrome. An X-CSRF-TOKEN header on GitHub API requests, which a normal GitHub client does not send. The commit message "commit from INSOMNIA".


Limit which outside tenants your machines can sign in to. Microsoft's Tenant Restrictions v2 lets an organization block sign-ins from its managed devices and network to tenants it has not approved. Test whether it stops an app-only client-credentials token request like GraphDoor's before you rely on it; we have not tested that.


Feed it. Block the attacker-owned indicators below at your firewall and EDR.



Indicators


From Kaspersky's two indicator lists. GitHub, SharePoint, Microsoft Graph, Ably, gofile and the legitimate signed programs are left out on purpose.



Kaspersky also lists the MeshCentral agent, 74b025084026d8d9a64661bf995d835b. We did not add it to our feed because it is a legitimate tool's binary and we cannot tell from the report whether that hash is unique to this operator's build. Hunt for it; think before you block it.


MeshCentral C2. 27.102.66[.]162


Proxy servers. 104.194.154[.]28, 216.73.158[.]72, 122.147.252[.]16, 103.106.230[.]33, 123.58.205[.]105, 223.165.4[.]203, 172.86.66[.]19, 103.214.68[.]20, 216.146.25[.]173, 103.137.63[.]39, 103.227.224[.]189, 104.194.152[.]173, 66.42.52[.]137, 153.75.94[.]148, 45.59.124[.]164, 104.194.153[.]161, 153.75.95[.]27, 216.73.158[.]117, 154.205.154[.]209, 43.134.62[.]111, 38.54.17[.]113. (Kaspersky also lists 38.52.17[.]113; see above for why we did not add it.)


Cobalt Strike C2 domains. twnic[.]top (including ms.twnic[.]top) and ekmt[.]tw.


Hunt-only, do not block the platform: SharePoint sites buildersemp.sharepoint[.]com and cskautogo.sharepoint[.]com; Entra tenant ID 8f50c589-a4d6-4df4-95bb-2fb7f5983fe5; the nine GitHub accounts listed above.



How we know


We read both Kaspersky posts in full, including both indicator appendices, and quote them directly above. The Hacker News article pointed us to them. Before writing, we looked up the MeshCentral C2 address, the GitDoor hash, three of the proxy addresses and twnic.top in our own corpus. None were there, so nothing in this post is a claim that we saw any of it first. This is a host-side backdoor with outbound command and control, and our edge sensors watch inbound web traffic, so they would not see it. We did not look.


We wrote 38 of these indicators (14 hashes, 22 addresses, 2 domains, with 38.52.17[.]113 and the MeshCentral agent hash left out) to a curated feed batch attributed to Kaspersky's report. At publication the write had not yet been confirmed by read-back, so do not assume our blocklist already carries them. Block from the list above.



Sources


  • Kaspersky GReAT (Saurabh Sharma, Noushin Shabab), "Operation ShadowCloud: cloud service–based backdoors targeting government networks in Asia and Africa. Part 1," Securelist, November 17, 2026: https://securelist.com/operation-shadowcloud-gitdoor/122004/

  • Kaspersky GReAT, same title, Part 2, Securelist, November 17, 2026: https://securelist.com/operation-shadowcloud-graphdoor/122005/

  • The Hacker News, "New GitDoor and GraphDoor Backdoors Turn GitHub and SharePoint Into Covert C2 Channels," November 17, 2026: https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/new-gitdoor-and-graphdoor-backdoors.html

  • DugganUSA, Backdoor Turn got the headlines; ConvoC2 is the version anyone can run



Every indicator in this post is in the feed. Free.

1.58M+ IOCs, STIX 2.1 / TAXII, 88% novel vs ThreatFox, exploited-CVE leads ahead of CISA. No credit card — a free API key in 30 seconds, and you can audit every claim above against the live endpoints.


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