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Retadup Was Taken Down in 2019. Someone Re-Registered Its C2 Domains, and Old USB Infections Now Pull CoffeeLoader. Block 10 Hostnames, Hunt 5 Hashes.

Writer: Patrick Duggan
Patrick Duggan
2 hours ago
6 min read

Do this first. Block these ten hostnames at DNS and your proxy: alphanoob[.]com, newblackage[.]com, newminersage[.]com, radnewage[.]com, minernewage[.]com, rad2016.publicvm[.]com, radpal.publicvm[.]com, roro2016.linkpc[.]net, internet-speed-check[.]com, rurjfvn[.]rs, and the subdomains of all of them. Hunt for five MD5 hashes (listed below). Then block program execution from USB and external drives, because that is how this worm moves.


The two dynamic-DNS entries are hostnames on free shared services. Block the exact hostnames rad2016.publicvm[.]com, radpal.publicvm[.]com and roro2016.linkpc[.]net. Do not block publicvm[.]com or linkpc[.]net as a whole: other people use those services.



What happened


Retadup is a Windows worm first seen in 2017, written in AutoIt and AutoHotkey. In July 2019 French law enforcement, working with Avast, took over its command servers and told every infected machine that checked in to delete the worm. Kaspersky's report puts the result at "more than 850,000 machines" disinfected within weeks.


That cleanup only reached machines that checked in. Some did not, and those worm copies kept trying to reach the old command domains for years.


Kaspersky published on November 16, 2026, in a report by Oleg Kupreev titled "A USB worm's second life: Retadup spreading CoffeeLoader." The key finding, in their words: "Two years ago, someone began re-registering the domain names that Retadup had used as C2 servers and using them to issue commands to download third-party malware." At first the servers handed out SmokeLoader. In early 2025, they switched to CoffeeLoader, a loader that Zscaler ThreatLabz first documented in March 2025.


Whoever registered the expired domains took over every surviving infection that still calls them. Kaspersky shows "a 2017 Retadup variant that still communicates successfully with its C2 in 2026." In August 2026, its command server answered with an instruction to download update.exe from rurjfvn[.]rs.



Who is behind it: not known


Kaspersky does not attribute this. Quoting the report: "We don't know whether it was the worm's author or someone else that decided to revive the C2 servers, since Retadup's C2 protocol is fairly simple: it consists of plaintext commands encoded with Base64 and then converted to hex." Anyone who registers a lapsed domain can speak that protocol, so it does not prove who is behind this. Do not read this as the 2019 operators returning.



How it spreads


Spread is still by removable media. Per Kaspersky, the worm "copied itself to all connected USB flash drives and external drives as hidden files and shortcuts (LNK files). When a user opened the infected flash drive on another PC and clicked the shortcut, the worm made its way onto the new device." Turning off AutoRun does not stop this, because the user clicks the shortcut.



Where the victims are, and how many


Kaspersky's own telemetry for the first three quarters of 2026 shows its products "blocked Retadup worm infection attempts on around 15,000 systems, most of them in Peru, Angola, Russia, and Bolivia." That count covers machines running Kaspersky products only. It does not cover the whole internet, and it does not count successful infections. Kaspersky calls the new campaign "much smaller in scale" than the 850,000 machines of 2019.


Kaspersky also writes that it first detected this CoffeeLoader variant in August 2026.



What the new CoffeeLoader variant does


  • An NSIS installer drops a patched copy of the 7-Zip library, 7z.dll, into a temp folder and runs it with rundll32.exe. Part of the real library was replaced with shellcode from a new version of the Armoury packer. The packer now uses the GPU through OpenGL to decrypt itself. The old version used OpenCL.

  • Persistence. The DLL is copied to a folder under %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA%. The folder, file and registry value names are all eight hex digits derived from the system volume, for example C:\ProgramData\b79faace\b79faace.dll. It starts through the Run key with a value like rundll32.exe "C:\ProgramData\b79faace\b79faace.dll",SetCodecs.

  • Self-protection. It writes a value under Explorer\StartupApproved\Run so the user cannot disable the startup entry from Task Manager.

  • Injection. It starts dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe or AtBroker.exe and injects into it.

  • Download. It fetches the main body over HTTPS from a hardcoded C2 with GET /payload?md5= (all zeros on the first request), using a Firefox 152 user agent. In Kaspersky's capture the host was api.internet-speed-check[.]com, behind Cloudflare. Responses are signed and checked against a public key in the Trojan.

  • Commands are unchanged. Kaspersky "found no changes in functionality": inject a payload into a process, save and run an EXE, or save a DLL and run it with rundll32.exe. The old 0xC0FFEE42 protocol constant that gave CoffeeLoader its name is now 0xD1D57871.


Indicators (all from Kaspersky's report)


Retadup C2 domains: alphanoob[.]com, newblackage[.]com, newminersage[.]com, radnewage[.]com, minernewage[.]com, rad2016.publicvm[.]com, radpal.publicvm[.]com, roro2016.linkpc[.]net. Kaspersky's traffic sample also shows the host noobminer.newblackage[.]com.


CoffeeLoader C2: internet-speed-check[.]com (seen as api.internet-speed-check[.]com).


CoffeeLoader download URLs: rurjfvn[.]rs/update.exe and alphanoob[.]com/update.exe.




Kaspersky published no IP addresses. The CoffeeLoader C2 sits behind Cloudflare, so its IPs would be shared Cloudflare edge addresses. Block it by name, not by IP.



What to do


  1. Block the domains above at DNS and the proxy. Look back through DNS logs for any lookups of them. If a machine on your network resolves one of them, a surviving infection is checking in.

  2. Hunt for the persistence. Look for Run-key values that start rundll32.exe on a DLL in a folder under ProgramData or AppData\Local named with eight hex digits, with the export SetCodecs. A real 7-Zip install does not start this way. Also look for the matching value under Explorer\StartupApproved\Run.

  3. Hunt for the process chain. Look for rundll32.exe starting dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe or AtBroker.exe, followed by outbound HTTPS. Look in proxy logs for GET /payload?md5= requests. For the old worm, look for GET requests shaped like /<32 hex characters>/1/4/1/0/empty with a WinHttp user agent.

  4. Stop USB execution. Use the Microsoft Defender attack surface reduction rule "Block untrusted and unsigned processes that run from USB", or Group Policy's Removable Storage Access setting that denies execute. Scan shared drives and kiosk machines for hidden folders next to LNK files at the drive root.

  5. Clean infected machines fully. Removing CoffeeLoader is not enough if the original Retadup worm is still on the machine and on its USB drives. It will reinfect.

  6. For defenders who sinkhole or take over domains: a takeover only lasts while someone keeps renewing the domains. This campaign started after the 2019 domains were registered again.


How we know, and what we hold


Every technical claim above comes from Kaspersky's Securelist report. We read it directly. The Hacker News summarized it on November 16. The two are one source, not two.


We checked each of Kaspersky's indicators against our corpus with exact lookups. All eight Retadup C2 domains, internet-speed-check[.]com, rurjfvn[.]rs and all five MD5s are in the iocs index. They are also in the default domains.csv and hashes.csv that subscribers download today, at confidence 70. They entered our index on November 17, 2026 at 08:36 UTC from TweetFeed, a third-party feed that relays researcher posts. That was the day after Kaspersky published. This is redistribution of a public source, not a detection by us, and we were not first.


The records carry no actor or malware-family label. If you filter our feed at min_confidence=80, which is our own edge shield's floor, these rows drop out. Pull them from this post by hand. Two hostnames, api.internet-speed-check[.]com and noobminer.newblackage[.]com, are not held as exact indicators. A parent-domain block covers them.


We did not run an edge check for this campaign. Our edge sensors see inbound requests to our own sites, and this traffic is outbound from infected endpoints. A null result from us would mean nothing.



What is not known


  • Who registered the domains, and whether they are the original Retadup author.

  • How many machines are infected now. The 15,000 figure is blocked attempts on Kaspersky-protected machines only.

  • What CoffeeLoader delivers after it lands in this campaign. Kaspersky documents the loader and its commands but names no final payload for 2026.

  • Whether other expired Retadup domains, beyond the "most active" ones Kaspersky lists, are also back online.


Sources


  • Kaspersky Securelist, Oleg Kupreev, "A USB worm's second life: Retadup spreading CoffeeLoader," November 16, 2026: https://securelist.com/retadup-delivers-coffeeloader/121908/

  • The Hacker News, "Retadup Worm Resurfaces 7 Years After Takedown to Spread CoffeeLoader Malware," November 16, 2026: https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/retadup-worm-resurfaces-7-years-after.html

  • Zscaler ThreatLabz, "CoffeeLoader: A Brew of Stealthy Techniques," March 2025: https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/coffeeloader-brew-stealthy-techniques



Every indicator in this post is in the feed. Free.

1.58M+ IOCs, STIX 2.1 / TAXII, 88% novel vs ThreatFox, exploited-CVE leads ahead of CISA. No credit card — a free API key in 30 seconds, and you can audit every claim above against the live endpoints.


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