Fugaku Was Breached Through Its Public Status Dashboard and the Intruder Tried Users' Stored SSH Keys Elsewhere. If You Trust a Key That Lived on Fugaku, Revoke It Today

What to do first. If you, or anyone who works with you, ever kept an SSH private key, an access key or another credential in a home directory on Fugaku or RIKYU, treat it as stolen. Remove the matching public key from every server, Git host and cloud account that trusts it, then generate a new key pair. RIKEN says the intruder already tried some of the stolen credentials against systems outside RIKEN. Admins at universities and labs: search your authorized_keys files, Git deploy keys and cloud IAM for keys belonging to Fugaku users, and check SSH logs from November 10 onward for logins with those keys.
What RIKEN confirmed
RIKEN published its notice on November 16, 2026 and updated it on November 17. It says an outside party was inside Fugaku's internal operational network from November 10 to 13. The entry point was "a publicly accessible web page displaying Fugaku's operational status (the dashboard)". How that page was exploited is still under investigation.
RIKEN's timeline (Japan time):
Nov 12: suspicious network traffic detected, and the outsourced operator contacted.
Nov 13, 4:33 PM: unauthorized access confirmed. The system used for the intrusion was isolated at 10:07 PM.
Nov 14, 4:30 AM: Fugaku operations suspended and external access blocked. Administrative keys were replaced at 8:20 PM.
Nov 15: login public keys for all users invalidated, every running and queued job halted, and users emailed.
Nov 16: Personal Information Protection Commission notified, and the public notice issued.
What was taken, or may have been:
Names, email addresses and user IDs for up to 4,222 Fugaku users, and names and email addresses for up to 375 RIKYU users. That is up to 4,597 people in total. One section of the English notice says 4,224, which is two more than its own overview and the Japanese page.
Some files in users' home directories. Those include credentials for external systems, which RIKEN names as SSH private keys and access keys, and research files.
RIKEN also says some compromised servers were tampered with, "including through the installation of malicious programs".
RIKEN says the intruder "attempted to connect to other systems using some of the obtained credentials". It does not say whether any attempt succeeded and is still investigating secondary damage. RIKEN notified the HPCI organizations on November 15. HPCI is Japan's shared national research computing network, so admins at other HPCI centers are the first people who should check for logins from Fugaku users' keys. The Register reports that the stolen credentials include ones for supercomputers that RIKEN does not run, and that RIKEN is working with the sites that host them. It also says there is no evidence so far that research data was exfiltrated.
What is not known
How the dashboard was exploited. No CVE, product or software name has been published.
Who did it. RIKEN names no group, country or motive. Reports that attribute this breach go beyond the notice.
Indicators. The notice lists no IPs, domains, hashes or file names, so we have added nothing to the feed. If RIKEN or JPCERT/CC publishes indicators, we will ingest them and update this post.
When Fugaku comes back. RIKEN will restart only after it fixes the exploited vulnerabilities, rebuilds the compromised servers and reviews the network design. No date has been given.
Why this one travels
A shared research supercomputer is a key ring. Thousands of researchers from universities, national labs and companies log in, and many keep the keys they use to push code, pull data or reach their home clusters right in their home directory. A single intrusion on the cluster yields keys to all of those other places. RIKEN's own advice says the same thing: the danger is the outside systems that trust those keys, not Fugaku itself.
The same exposure exists at every shared HPC center, and at every jump host or CI runner where people leave private keys. If this incident prompts any change, it should be keeping private keys off shared systems: use agent forwarding with care, hardware-backed keys, or short-lived certificates instead.
What to do
For every SSH key that was ever stored on Fugaku, remove its public key from each service that trusts it. Check GitHub, GitLab, university clusters, cloud VMs and any authorized_keys file you control. Then create a new pair, and do not store the new private key on a shared system.
Revoke and reissue any API tokens, cloud access keys or passwords saved in files on Fugaku.
Expect phishing that uses the incident as a lure. RIKEN says it will never ask for your password or personal information by email.
List the SSH public keys on your systems that belong to Fugaku users, and require them to be rotated.
Review SSH and Git access logs from November 10 onward for logins with those keys, especially from addresses that do not match the user's usual sources.
Check cloud audit logs for activity by access keys that may have been stored on Fugaku.
A status page that is open to the world but runs on, or reaches into, the management network is a bridge. Serve it from a static copy outside that network, or push data out one way so nothing on the internet can reach back in.
How we know
Everything above about the incident comes from RIKEN's notice in English and Japanese, both read in full on November 17, 2026. Press coverage, including the Spanish-language X post that brought this to us, matches the notice on the core facts. We found no indicators to feed and no CVE to check against our edge sensors. This post has no lead claim.
Sources
RIKEN: Notice regarding a possible personal information leak affecting Fugaku and RIKYU users following unauthorized access to the supercomputer Fugaku (English), https://www.riken.jp/en/news_pubs/news/2026/20261116_2/index.html
RIKEN: Japanese version of the same notice, https://www.riken.jp/pr/news/2026/20261116_2/index.html
The Register: Japan's Fugaku supercomputer has decidedly un-super security (November 17, 2026), https://www.theregister.com/
Xinhua (Kyodo): Unauthorized access detected on Japan's Fugaku supercomputer, http://english.news.cn/20261116/ec0489b843444d4f96d49d0660150357/c.html
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